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Kosovo is distinguished from other transition countries by being the last country 
to embark on privatisation. The wave of revolutionary political and economic changes 
spreading like wildfire across the Central and Eastern European countries and in former 
Soviet Union since 1989 found Kosovo under occupation for a full decade. Privatisation 
as one of the most crucial elements of market-oriented reforms was not extended to 
socially owned enterprises (SOEs) in Kosovo, despite the fact that it was originally 
initiated by the last president of the Federal Executive Council of former Yugoslavia, 
Ante Marković and used in a limited number of enterprises. The overwhelming majority 
of SOEs in Kosovo came under a series of the so-called ‘emergency measures’ 
introduced by Serbia during the 1990s, resulting in the dismissal of the Albanian 
employees at large, the de facto occupation of Kosovar SOEs, and the forced merger with 
Serbian companies. For nearly a decade, SOEs in Kosovo became subject to illegal 
ownership transactions and transformation with serious implications for the post-war 
legal privatisation.    
With the disappearance of the Serbian state control after the 1999 war, the people 
of Kosovo expressed their desire to build a democratic market economy. Since June 
                                                 

 I am grateful to Professor Iraj Hashi for his comments and remarks. The data used in this paper for 
analysis come from a survey that I conducted with a group of enterprises in the Gjakova region. The second 
set of data for comparative analysis with socially-owned and newly established private enterprises come 
from the Riinvest Institute, where I was involved as a member of the team in conducting surveys and 
processing the resulting data.   
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1999, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been in charge of 
Kosovo’s development. According to this Resolution, Kosovo is to have substantial 
autonomy and self-government over her affairs. With the beginning of the transition to a 
market system, the discussion of privatisation also resurfaced under the UNMIK. One 
particular problem that UNMIK has faced was the issue of social ownership and SOEs. 
For many UNMIK officials it was not clear who the real owners of SOEs were and 
whether social ownership was the same as state ownership. This led to UNMIK’s 
hesitation in deciding on its approach to managing SOEs in Kosovo. It took nearly one 
year to come with the first privatisation proposal. Other proposals followed, until June 
2002 when the final proposal, envisaging privatisation via the ‘spin-off’ approach and 
reorganisation or liquidation through the bankruptcy process was approved. After a good 
start in July 2003, the continuation of privatisation was called into question and 
temporarily suspended in October.  
In this paper we look at the specific features of the delayed privatisation in 
Kosovo, emphasising in particular two stages: i) the events during 1990s, including the 
consequences of emergency measures, ii)  the impact of a autonomous privatisation in the 
early 1990s in a limited number of SOEs in the Gjakova region based on a survey of 
these enterprises, and iii) the critical assessment of the privatisation proposals and the 
challenges in continuing the ongoing privatisation process after the war. 
To find out and understand why privatisation has been subject to so much delay, it 
is necessary to look back and discuss the roots of the problem. Section one of this paper 
gives a background of Kosovo under former Yugoslavia and self-management socialism. 
Section two then provides insights on the incidence of SOEs during 1990s, namely 
emergency measures, transformation through forced merger and their consequences. The 
impact of privatisation limited to a number of enterprises in the Gjakova region is 
assessed in section three. Section four treats privatisation addressed under new 
institutional settings after the war. Then this is expanded in sub-sections dealing with 
critical assessment of the privatisation proposals and the approved model of privatisation. 
An overview of the privatisation progress limited to the first two rounds is given in 
section five. It also discusses the difficulties to implementation of the privatisation and 
identifies the causes and implication of interim suspension of the process. Section six 
concludes and addresses some remarks. 
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1. Background of Kosovo under former Yugoslavia and Self-management Socialism 
 
Kosovo was one of the eight federal units of former Yugoslavia alongside 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia. In this respect, Kosovo was an equal member, including the right of a veto. It 
had her own constitution that regulated the principles of political, economic and, social 
system, territorial organisation, and her relations with Serbia and the federation. 
According to Article 399 of the 1974 Constitution of Socialist Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo (SAPK), neither the federal nor Serbia’s Constitution could be changed without 
compliance of the Parliament of SAPK.  
Social and economic relationships in Kosovo were the same with those in other 
federal units. The base of economic system was social ownership over the means of 
production managed by the workers. The definition of social ownership by the 1974 
Constitution of Kosovo as well as of Yugoslavia (section III of basic principles of both 
Constitutions) stated that society at large is the owner and no one in particular has full 
ownership right over socially-owned means of production. This specific type of property 
that was central to the concept of self-management socialism gave rise to much 
discussion among social scientists (especially economists, sociologists and legal 
experts).1  
The definition of SOEs in this paper has been adopted as provided by the reform 
of 1974 when enterprises were reorganised into Basic Organisations of Associated 
Labour (BOALs). Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (1990) showed that there were 558 
BOALs in Kosovo in 1988 dealing with economic and non-economic activities. They 
could be merged to form larger organisations of associated labour such as Working 
Organisations and Composite Organisations. SOEs also cooperated and could voluntarily 
merge with enterprises in other federal units, vertically (enterprises with similar type of 
activity) or horizontally (cluster or related activities). 
 
                                                 
1
 In absence of a detailed and multidisciplinary analysis many argued and came to an ambiguous and 
unclear conclusion that social ownership is a property of ´everyone´ and ´no one´ at the same time. A 
clearer and broader approach on the specific features of social property in legal, social and economic terms 
is provided by Horvat (1982: 235-239, 2001). Further clarifications between legal and economic concepts 
of social property were introduced by Bajt (1988: 152-154). On the deficiencies of definition of social 
property and implications see an earlier article by Furubotn and Pejovich (1970). To identify deficiencies 
and incomplete definition of social property compare it with some modern definitions on complete 
ownership rights provided in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), Blair (1995), Anderson and Huggins 
(2003), etc.        
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2. Emergency Measures and Transformation through Forced Mergers 
 
After the illegal abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy by Serbia2 on 23 March 
1989, the era of the destruction of SOEs in Kosovo began. One year before its 
disintegration, the Federal Parliament passed the ‘Yugoslav Programme of Measures and 
Activities for Stopping the Emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the Socialist 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAPK), Quick Return of those that Emigrated and 
Immigration of all those who Want to Live and Work in Kosovo’ (Official Gazette of 
SFRY No. 8, 9 February 1990).3 The Programme in Article 49 highlighted ‘tight 
integration of self-management entities from Kosovo with entities in Serbia and other 
parts of the country, for their faster development’. The programme was prepared by 
Serbia for her own interests but was passed on behalf of Yugoslavia. However, after less 
than two months, Serbia passed the ‘Programme for Realisation of Peace, Freedom, 
Equality of Rights, Democracy and Prosperity in SAPK’ (Official Gazette of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia-SRS, No. 15, 30 March 1990). Article 55 of the Serbian programme 
reiterated one of the main points of the Federal Programme, i.e. integration of SOEs from 
Kosovo with enterprises in Serbia. 
To implement the above-mentioned programmes the Parliament of Serbia passed 
a considerable number of laws and acts to be implemented in Kosovo. Firstly, the ‘Law 
on Republican Bodies Acting in Exceptional Circumstances’ (Official Gazette of SRS 
No. 30), was passed on 26 June 1990. Provisions of this Law had many similarities with 
those of the Federal and Kosovo’s Constitutions in relation to the imposition of special 
measures on SOEs.4 An important element was Article 11 by which the Serbian 
                                                 
2
 This was an act that directly violated not only the federal and Kosovo’s Constitution but even Serbia’s 
own Constitution. Articles 394 and 398 of the 1974 Constitution of Kosovo state that the Constitution can 
be changed only by the decision of the Parliament of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAPK). 
The Constitutional Court of SAPK was entrusted with the protection of that Constitution (Article 106).  
3
 The main objectives of this programme were to encourage Serbs from different parts of Yugoslavia to 
settle, live and work in Kosovo. To achieve these objectives the programme anticipated the use of federal 
funds to develop the regions of Kosovo in which Serbs and Montenegrins were already living, or where the 
national composition is mixed, and also places where the new settlers were expected to come (Section II of 
the Programme). Funds were to be used for granting of credits primarily to Serbs and Montenegrins, then to 
all non Albanians as it stated in Article 64, to build apartments, houses, plants, and farms. 
4
 Some of these measures amounting to suspension of self-management rights were done under the 
provisions of SFRY and SAPK Constitutions regarding the so-called ‘interim measures’. The possibility of 
introducing such measures in SOEs was stipulated in Article 130 of the 1974 Kosovo’s Constitution. The 
measures would apply only if self-management relations were disrupted and as such harmed the social 
interest. If it came to such a situation, then the Assembly of the socio-political community would dissolve 
the workers’ council or other corresponding management organs and appoint provisional organs according 
to a procedure specified by statute. The aim of the measures was to protect the self-management rights of 
working people and of social property on the initiative of workers, organisation of associated labour, trade 
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parliament could unilaterally decide on the presence of reasons justifying emergency 
measures without involving those who could initiate them, primarily the workers of 
SOEs. This decision violated the provisions of the procedure for interim measures since it 
ignored the opinion and initiative of other stakeholders. Moreover, imposing such 
measures was not a matter for one republic or province over enterprises in another federal 
unit, but for each federal unit over their own enterprises and for a limited period.5 
Secondly, the ‘Law on Labour Relations in Exceptional Circumstances’ (Official 
Gazette of SRS No. 40) was passed on the same day as the Law No. 30/90, and amended 
on 27 September 1990 (Official Gazette of SRS No. 54). The new labour relations meant 
emergency measures which could be imposed even without public announcement (Article 
3). They were to be implemented by the director appointed by the socio-political 
community. The existing workers could be dismissed for disobedience of rules, including 
hampering the work of the others. With changes made to Article 8, the director could 
dismiss the workers without giving them the reasons for his decision. The Albanian 
employees, however, did not accept these decisions as they considered them unlawful. 
Members of the Parliament of SAPK reacted against these actions by declaring 
Kosovo as a republic within the Yugoslav Federation on 2 July 1990 in front of the 
closed doors of the Parliament building in Prishtina. Three days later, the Parliament of 
Serbia passed the ‘Law on Abolishing the Operation of the Parliament of SAPK and the 
Executive Council of the Parliament of SAPK’, (Official Gazette of SRS No. 33, of 5 
July 1990). The implementation of this and other above mentioned laws removed all the 
competencies of administrative institutions of Kosovo and centralised the power in the 
hands of the leadership in Serbia. The measures were imposed in different forms, 
including the use of force.6 Whenever applied, they were associated with massive 
dismissal of the Albanian employees.  
                                                                                                                                                 
unions and other socio-political organisations, state organs, and citizens. As long as these parties did not 
take this initiative, self-management and social property were guaranteed special social protection by the 
socio-political communities, courts, public prosecutors, and social attorney of self-management (Article 
129 and Article 131). 
5
 The Kosovo ‘Law on interim measures for protecting self-management rights and social ownership’ 
(Official Gazette of SAPK, No. 46/1977, 52/1986 and 21/1988) envisaged that, if introduced, the measures 
cannot last more than a year. In case it was estimated that an enterprise needs interim measures, then the 
municipal council of the district in which this case appeared was in charge of introducing them, including 
enterprise units or subsidiaries in other districts. The parliament of SAPK was to undertake interim 
measures only in enterprises of strategic interest for the province (Article 2).  
6
 The same day (on 5 July 1990) that the SRS Law No. 33 (on the Abolishing the Operation of the 
Parliament of SAPK) was passed, the militia from Serbia took over by force the only public broadcasting 
TV in Kosovo, the Radio and Television of Prishtina – RTP. Sometime after 3 p.m. RTP disappeared from 
the air. After several days it was back on air again, initially broadcasting the programme of RTS from 
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By 1993, emergency measures were implemented in 237 SOEs.7 After the 
occupation of SOEs Serbia began their privatisation pursuant to her Law on the 
Conditions and Procedures for Transformation of Social Ownership into other Ownership 
Forms (Official Gazette of SRS No. 48, 5 August 1991). The decision on privatisation 
was to be made by SOEs themselves. Current employees were entitled to a discount 20% 
plus 1% further discount for each year of employment (Article 16) with proceedings 
going to: i) Serbian Development Fund (SDF) (60%); ii) Serbian Pension Fund (30%); 
and iii) Serbian Labour Market Fund (10%) (Article 17). This scheme clearly shows that 
Serbia was engaged in plundering the social capital of Kosovo. 
 
2.1. Consequences of Emergency Measures 
 
The consequences of emergency measures soon became obvious. From 5 July 
1990 to the end of December 1991 they resulted in the dismissal of the following number 
of directors and/or their deputies in SOEs: 291 Albanians, 54 Serbs and Montenegrins, 20 
Bosnians and Turks. They were replaced by: 13 Albanians, 370 Serbs and Montenegrins 
and, 8 Bosnians and Turks. Most of the appointed Albanians were not even consulted in 
advance. They were appointed to give the impression that the management in charge of 
executing emergency measures constituted a wider ranging ethnic composition, including 
Albanians. Most of the appointed Albanians did not accept the offered positions, thus 
they were replaced by Serbs and Montenegrins (Fetahu, 1992: 150-151). From a total 
number of 164,000 Albanian employees at the end of 1989 in social sector, emergency 
leadership forcefully dismissed more than 130,000 of them between 1990 and 1992 and 
began to hire new Serb workers from Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
including some Serb newcomers from Albania and Romania (Association of Lawyers of 
Kosovo, 2003).  
The plan for the transformation of 237 SOEs was carried out more efficiently than 
expected as the ownership of 80-90% of their assets were transferred to the account of 
enterprises in Serbia. The Kosovo Serbian newspaper ‘Jedinstvo’ of 17.04.1995 reported 
that there were cases when even 100% of the ownership of assets were transferred.8 
Another 100 enterprises were fully merged with other enterprises in Serbia and 96 linked 
                                                                                                                                                 
Belgrade, then it operated with a number of Serb employees, and very few Albanian-speaking new 
workers. This marked the first case of imposing emergency measures.    
7
 The Serbia’s daily newspaper ‘Borba’ of 27 January, 1993 indicated that emergency measures also 
included: 101 education, health, science and cultural institutions; 20 agriculture cooperatives; and 9 media 
companies, including the only daily newspaper in Albanian ‘Rilindja’, which was closed down.   
8
 These cases included 17 agriculture combines that were merged with PKB combine in Belgrade.  
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to SDF (Jedinstvo, 29.03.1993). Such a quick transformation and merger was made 
possible simply by ignoring economic criteria and by merging the assets of one SOE 
from Kosovo with several entities in Serbia from different sectors and ownership types.9 
The misuse of social ownership resulted in disputes and protests even by those who at the 
beginning, were benefiting from this type of transformation.10 Furthermore, the appointed 
managers (and their relatives) also embarked on misusing social ownership.11 
The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) was closely 
observing the situation and made it known to Serbia the damages and economic and 
social consequences of forceful mergers. At the same time, through various international 
trade union organisations, BSPK appealed to foreign investors not to make any 
agreement with Serbia regarding SOEs in Kosovo under those circumstances as it will 
consider such agreements illegal and invalid with investors running the risk of losing 
their investment (BSPK, 1993; Association of Lawyers of Kosovo, 2003).12 Similarly, the 
Kosovo government in exile, through her ministries and the directors of SOEs, was 
observing the situation and on 18 March 1992 declared all transactions related to 
ownership transformation in Kosovo by the Serbian apparatus illegal and invalid (Bujku, 
19.03.1993). 
                                                 
9
 To illustrate this, the assets of the Sharr cement plant in Hani i Elezit were transferred to the following 
account of enterprises in Serbia: SDF (5%), ‘Kopaonik’ the company for trading of construction materials 
in Belgrade (20%), JSC irrigation system ‘Dunav-Tisa-Dunav’ in Novi-Sad (15%), water supply ‘Južna 
Morava’ in Niš (5%), Institute for Market Research in Belgrade (5%) and, holding company 
‘Termoelectron’ in Belgrade (5%). The assets of metalwork Metamb from Prishtina were transferred to: 
SDF (9%), pharmaceutical company ‘Zorka’ in Šabac (10%), aluminium processing plant ‘Valaonica’ in 
Sevonjo (10%), glass plant in Paračin (10%), mineral water plant ‘Voda Vrnjci’ in Vernjačka Banja (10%), 
‘Elan’ in Subotica (10%), etc. (Fetahu, 1997). These examples clearly indicate that mergers did not have 
any economic logic.  
10
 It was not a surprise when 129 workers (almost all Serbs) of the metalwork plant in Ferizaj (Kosovo) 
went on strike for 45 days because they had not received their salaries for 6 months, and blamed the 
emergency leadership for abuse and extreme poverty caused in the factory and demanded that the factory 
get rid of integration with Jugoasbest from Mlladenovac in Serbia (Jedinstvo, 14.09.1995). 
11
 For example, after the transformation and forceful merge of Minex from Ferizaj (Kosovo) with Bambi 
from Požarevac (Serbia), 126 employees managed to buy only 2.36% of the shares, while the appointed 
emergency director together with his wife, son and  friends who never worked for Minex, obtained more 
than 50% of the shares (Jedinstvo, 12.10.1993). Another example, the Serb newspaper ‘Borba’ of 
11.10.1993 reported on financial transactions in two large Kosovar companies Trepça and Ferronikel with 
some private firms from Belgrade, in which some individuals had stolen around $6 million and DM7 
million. Suspected included Kosta Prstić (in management positions in Trepça and, Feronikel), and Radomir 
Kilibarda (the emergency director of Eximkos company, and then of Feronikel). Outright theft and misuse 
had forced the chairman of the trade unions of Serbia for Kosovo (Momir Popović) to complain that: i) 
ownership transformation in Kosovo was implemented in a quite different way than in ‘other regions’; ii) 
this transformation was one-sided because trade unions and workers were not involved; and iii) 
transformation was implemented by emergency management for their personal interests through 
transferring the assets to outside of Kosovo, etc. (Jedinstvo, 17.04.1995). In Serbia too, the appointed 
directors of SOEs, especially of large ones, turned social ownership into the tool of regime to benefit 
through economic criminality and fraudulent operations  (Tijanić and Čuruvija, 1999; Palairet, 2001). 
12
 The sources do not provide the names of any international trade unions or organisations for such appeal.    
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After declaring SOEs in Kosovo as state property, Serbia passed the ‘Law on 
Ownership Transformation’ (Official Gazette of SRS No. 32/97) on 21 July 1997, 
providing a framework for the privatisation of state property. By that time, the ownership 
of most of the assets of SOEs from Kosovo had been transferred to different entities in 
Serbia. Current and former employees had the right to acquire shares for free at an 
equivalent of DM 400 for each year of employment. Employees could also buy the shares 
at a discount of 20% plus 1% for each year of employment (Article 12), with the 
proceeds from the sale of shares going to: SDF (50%), Republican Labour Market Fund 
(25%) and Republican Pension Fund (25%) (Article 23). This Law did not bring any 
advantage or comfort to the dismissed Albanians. Since the shares of Kosovar enterprises 
could have been acquired by employees of Serbian enterprises that had merged with 
them, it was clear that the Serbian employees would also become large shareholders of 
SOEs in Kosovo. The provision in Article 29, which stipulated that companies’ debts can 
be converted into shares for creditors, meant that the ownership of a further part of 
Kosovo’s enterprises was transferred to Serbian companies and institutions.      
To sum up, Serbia abolished Kosovo’s 1974 Constitution and imposed interim 
measures in the SAPK, both illegally. It then proceeded to appoint interim managers to 
SOEs and dismissed the vast majority of Albanian workers. It then passed laws to 
provide the framework for transformation and integration of Kosovo’s enterprises with 
Serbian enterprises and institutions. Following the privatisation laws of Serbia the bulk of 
the ownership of these companies was transferred to Serb employees and institutions. 
The transformation of Kosovo’s enterprises following the dismissal of Albanian 
employees was illegal. And so were the subsequent changes in the status of these 
enterprises. These illegal actions of Serbia in Kosovo became one of the main sources of 
the events in the first half of 1999 which dominated the world’s news headlines and 
forced the international community to intervene and take the province under 
administration.   
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3. Privatisation through Employee Ownership: The Experience of a Group of Firms 
in the Gjakova Region 
 
Following the deterioration in the performance of self-management socialism, in the 
late 1980s, the Federal Executive Council of former Yugoslavia decided to privatise 
socially-owned assets. The proposed method of privatisation as envisaged by the Law on 
Social Capital (Official Gazette of SFRY No. 84/89, 46/90 and 61/90) known as the 
Marković Law (named after the last president of Federal Executive Council of former 
Yugoslavia) was similar or effectively like Management and Employee Buy-outs 
(MEBOs).  Normally it amounted to the purchase of the firm from the government. In the 
case of Gjakova the employees did not buy the companies from the government since 
proceeds from the sale of internal shares were paid into the account of the companies’ 
own fund and not into the account of the government. This was made possible by the 
provision of Article 2 of the Law on Social Capital or the Marković Law.  
The process was supervised by the commercial court in Gjakova, though it has 
remained unfinished even today.13 The causes of this incomplete privatisation in Gjakova 
and, the non-implementation in other SOEs in Kosovo are already explained in previous 
section.  The decision for privatisation in some SOEs in Gjakova was made before June 
26, 1990 when the Serbian Parliament enacted the emergency measures through the Law 
No. 30/90. By embarking on ownership transformation enterprises could at least try to 
avoid the emergency measures legally since the state’s interference in an enterprise 
transformed into private hands would have been very limited if anything at all. The first 
step in this direction was the registration at the commercial court in Gjakova as JSCs, 
before June 1991 when the effect of the Serbian Law No 30/90 began to appear in 
Gjakova for the first time.14 The Court was forcibly closed down by the Serbian regime in 
August 1992, thus stopping any further legal attempt at ownership transformation. Until 
then, 20 SOEs (all enterprises in the social sector in Gjakova) had gone through the court, 
                                                 
13
 In relation to the enterprises undergoing ownership transformation in Kosovo from August 1990 to April 
1994, Uvalić (1997: 287) has cited Zec that 253 or 83% of all SOEs in economic sector were involved in 
ownership transformation. The capital of the overwhelming majority (235) of these enterprises was being 
transformed to other enterprises or to the Republican Development Fund directly by the Serbian 
government. According to the same source only 19 enterprises had completed the process, 18 of them in 
autonomous way. This group may be well identified with the enterprises in the Gjakova region which are 
the subject of investigation in this paper, but the process has never been completed.  
14
 Of course, in enterprises that were of greater interest to the Serbian regime, legal defence was useless and 
could not stop the regime if it really wanted to impose emergency measures, even though enterprises were 
legally transformed. Emergency measures were imposed in Ereniku company on June 25, 1991, just 5 days 
after the company changed its legal status into a JSC and was registered at the Commercial Court in 
Gjakova.  
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carried out registration procedures for ownership transformation with some having begun 
to sell shares to their employees. 
It did happen that in Gjakova, emergency measures were less common and with 
smaller consequences than in other districts, likely because of embarking on privatisation 
earlier. The Serbian regime did not take any immediate measures to reverse the 
transformations that had already occurred in Gjakova, i.e., after the closure of 
commercial court, but later showed that it had not forgotten these transformations. In 
May 1995, the Serbian Agency for Privatisation issued 5 decrees to abolish ownership 
transformation that had taken place in Gjakova, the reason being that they were 
transformed under the Marković Law, and that the money from the sale of shares was not 
paid into the account of Serbian government but into the account of enterprises 
themselves. Enterprises complained to the Serbian Supreme Court which decided in 
favour of the complainants (Jedinstvo, 11.08.1995). 
 
3.1 Theory of Employee Ownership 
 
A firm may be an employee-owned firm (EOF) from its inception when it is 
established by a group of people who work together for their mutual interests, and after 
privatisation through MEBOs. The main theoretical features applying to employee 
ownership are related to: objective function, salaries and employment, investment and, 
other economic and non-economic indicators (Bartlett, et al., 1992).  
The theory assumes that an EOF maximises personal incomes of its members as 
opposed to the maximisation of profit by the capitalist firm (CF). Other features of the 
firm’s performance are derived from the established objective function and the relevant 
constraints. Under the assumption of two firms that make the same level of profit, 
workers in CFs will receive salaries fixed by the manager or owner that is usually 
determined by the market. In contrast, workers in EOFs have the power through 
participation to acquire higher salaries which are expected to move together with the 
firm’s profit (Commander, et al. 1991). In the long run, as a higher proportion of 
enterprise profit is distributed as labour income, EOF have less to invest in comparison 
with the CF. Since workers in EOFs are decision makers, they are more likely to stay 
with the firm for a long time and employ less new workers. Their workers are encouraged 
to work longer hours thus the depreciation of capital is higher (Ireland and Law, 1982). 
Diffused decision-making process is expected to reduce EOFs ability to enforce a strong 
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discipline at work (in general workers do not penalise themselves). There is a general and 
widespread concern that EOFs are economically less efficient than CFs, although a meta-
analysis by Doucouliagos (1995) found that worker participation in decision-making in 
EOFs usually was positively correlated with productivity, though not always statistically 
significant. In non-economic performance, there is more evidence for the superiority of 
EOF over CF.15  
Employee ownership in transition economies, which is of particular relevance to 
this Paper, is used to speed up the transformation of enterprises into LMFs (Bogetić, 
1993). However, the difference between the LMFs as SOEs and EOFs is that the workers 
in SOEs of former Yugoslavia had some undefined and non-transferable ownership 
claims while ownership in EOFs is clearly defined and fully transferable. After SOEs 
were transformed into EOFs they still remained LMFs depending on ownership structure 
of employees and managers. Elsewhere in former socialist countries state enterprises 
became LMFs only after they were transformed into EOFs.   
The theory suggests that once enterprises are transformed into employee 
ownership, their performance is affected in different ways, having impacts for enterprise 
efficiency in the short term and for corporate governance in the longer term (Buck, et. al., 
1994). Berg and Berg (1997) have generally criticised insider domination as a relatively 
inefficient and inflexible form of ownership, maintain that privatised firms through 
employee-ownership are little different from state-owned firms. Jones and Mygind 
(2000) see this inefficiency arising from the conflict between short-run benefits and long-
run interests and, limited ability to conduct comprehensive restructuring. These are also 
the reasons for which Smith (1994) judged the insider domination a source of 
inefficiency that has its costs in decision making practices (delay to gain the collective’s 
consensus). 
The privatisation process in some transition countries (e.g. Russia, Poland, 
Estonia, etc.) generated many EOFs and it is useful to mention some of their experiences 
briefly. Earle (1998) investigated the impact of ownership structure on the productivity 
                                                 
15
 If EOFs are economically less efficient, they should be more efficient in non-economic terms, more 
humane and make workers happier (Horvat, 1986).  Findings of Bartlett, et al. (1992) which refer to the 
comparative performance of 35 CFs and 49 EOFs in the North-central Italy, go in favour of greater non-
economic benefits for the latter. On average, 40% of CFs have had strikes over the previous five years. 
Strikes were absent among EOFs. There were on average 3.8 missing days at work in EOFs vs. 7.9 in CFs. 
Lower rates of absenteeism were explained by the environment of cooperation and trust among members of 
EOFs. CFs had not used any programme of the European Commission for training, while 1.2% of the entire 
work force of EOFs were involved in these training programmes.        
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performance of Russian industrial enterprises by comparing the effects of several types of 
new private owners, e.g. insiders, outsiders and the state. Private share ownership had a 
positive impact on labour productivity in comparison to state ownership, while the impact 
of insider ownership  was statistically insignificant.  
Hashi (1998) used a small sample of twenty firms privatised through MEBOs in 
Poland to assess their performance. In spite of employees’ expectation, job cuts had to be 
accepted as a direct consequence of the competitive pressure faced by those firms. This 
pressure and the factor market had forced EOFs to undertake defensive restructuring and 
adjust their operations to improve productivity and financial position. Even though this 
study is based on a small sample, it may confirm the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel 
(1995) who also pointed out that EOFs in transition economies adjust their operation as 
dictated by the market forces. In Estonia, Kalmi (2002) found that firms privatised to 
foreign investors outperformed EOFs and generated employment while in EOFs 
employment declined. 
 
3.2 EOFs in Gjakova 
 
The impact of privatisation through employee ownership in Gjakova was found 
weak and difficult to assess because of the extraordinary conditions on the eve of, and 
shortly after, privatisation. In addition, the analysis is to some extent constrained because 
not all SOEs in Gjakova were transformed to EOFs. Having taken into consideration 
different degrees of ownership transformation in the group of 20 companies transformed 
into JSCs, we identified and classified the following three sub-groups for comparative 
analysis: i) Group A – 8 companies that completed the process by selling and distributing 
a majority of their shares to employees; ii) Group B – 7 companies that registered their 
transformation to JSCs, but there is no evidence that they sold or distributed their shares; 
and iii) Group C – 5 companies which made a decision to convert to JSCs and registered 
the decision at the Commercial Court but their ownership transformation was rescinded 










Table 1: Overview of ownership transformation in 20 Gjakova companies  
Groups Number of companies  Shares allocated 
to employees (%) 
 
Group A  
Companies that completed the 
process by selling and distributing 
a majority of their shares to 
employees  
1. Deva 64 
2. Dukagjini 94 
3. Elektromotori  100 
4. Emin Durakua) 50 
5. Ena 70b) 
6. IMN 70 
7. Jatex 53 
8. Metaliku 60 
 
Group Bc) 
Companies that registered their 
transformation to JSCs, but there 
is no evidence that they sold or 
distributed their shares 
9. Agimi 50 
10. BEC 57 
11. Email & Fonderia a) 55 
12. Ening  49 
13. Mishi a) 54 
14. Modeli  42 
15. Mulliri  49 
 
Group C 
Companies where transformation 
was rescinded by the imposition 
of emergency measures 
16. Elast a) __ 
17. Ereniku  __ 
18. Kompresor __ 
19. Kosovotrans __ 
20. Pashtriku __ 
a) Inactive companies. It does not mean they are closed down as two of them continued to generate some revenues 
(Elast, and Emin Duraku) either through leasing or sale of their assets, and pay a number of their workers. Two others 
(Mishi and Email & Fonderia) are temporarily closed down and due to the missing data (non-operation) are not 
included in the survey. The data for Mishi include only employment in 1989. 
b) The shares have remained registered but the evidence of selling and distribution to employees could not be 
confirmed. 
c) Shares allocated to employees in this group companies implies that these proportions went free of charge on discount 
basis as stipulated by the Marković Law (employees were entitled to a discount of 30% in buying internal shares, 
enhanced by another 1% for each year of employment).    
 
 
Whether the Gjakova JSCs are fully or partially EOFs, their management style 
remains similar to that in the previous self-management system. Under the new 
ownership status the workers’ council, as the central decision-making organ during self-
management, has been replaced by the shareholders’ assembly (this applies to Group A 
only). The assembly elects the management board and a general director as did the 
workers’ council.   
 
3.3 Employment and Personnel 
  
 Here we shall consider changes in the level of employment of the 19 companies 
(18 plus one company that had information for employment) in the survey. Table 2 shows 
the trend for the whole group as well as for the 3 sub-groups identified earlier. The result 
can be compared with those in the group of SOEs (Group D) and newly established 
private enterprises (SMEs or Group E). The major feature of Table 2 is the downward 
trend in employment in all groups.  
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Table 2: Number of actual employees (1989-2001) 
Groups JSCs A B C D (SOEs) E (SMEs) 





1989 10,426 7,106 2,437 883 67,313 n/a f) 
1991 8,566a) 6,556 1,835 175c) n/a f) n/af) 
1998 5,437a)  4,554 816 67c) n/a f) n/a f) 
1999 2,249b) 1,805 240 204d) 15,327 3,510 g) 
2000 2,196b) 1,739 223 234d) 21,578 3,900 g) 





1998/1989 0.84 e) 0.64 0.33 0.30e) n/a f) n/af) 
2001/1989 0.21e)  0.24 0.11 0.33e) 0.30 n/af) 
2000/1999 0.98 e) 0.96 0.93 1.15 1.41 1.11 
2001/1999 0.98 e) 0.96 1.09 1.07 1.33 1.09 





1989 549 888 348   221 398 n/af) 
1999 125 226 34 68 91 n/af) 
2000 122 217 32 78 128 11.7 
2001*   123 216 37 73 121 12.7 
a) 16 firms;  b) 18 firms;   c) One firm;   d) Three firms;  
e) This index is calculated by taking the mean number of employees. The number of employees per firm in 1998 (67) was divided by 
this mean. The same mean is multiplied by 3 to find the index for 2001 vs. 1989, i.e. 10,426/ (18 x 123) =0.21, or 219/(3 x 221) = 
0.33.  
f) Data not available            g) 300 firms    h) 600 firms 
* Includes only the second half of 1999 and the first half of 2001, and full year for SOEs and SMEs in 2001. 
 
The excepted objective of the workers in EOFs to try to save their job through 
employee ownership in transition economies was a desire which did not materialise in the 
Gjakova companies (as in other countries). What is also important, is that Group A was 
the only group with job cuts throughout the period under consideration. In spite of this, 
job security was greater in this group in the pre-war period since nearly 2/3 of their 1989 
work force was maintained in 1998. The largest job cut over the same period was in 
Group C, explained by the impact of emergency measures. Apart from Group A which 
had a continuous downward trend, other groups had some fluctuations in the number of 
actual employees. The similarity between SOEs and Group C should be emphasised: both 
groups increased employment in 2000 but returned to cuts in 2001.  
The gradual downward tendency in actual employment16 in Group A, especially 
after the war, is explained by the fact that employees with well-defined ownership rights 
were more motivated to decide on careful job cuts to adjust their activity to market 
                                                 
16
 Actual employees are identified with those actively engaged in the company. Because of downsized level 
of activity after the war not all employees registered with the company were actively engaged. The 
companies keep their register with the intention that after a better performance to (re)employ them. A 
considerable number of these registered employees as shown in the Table below were on unpaid leave, with 




Total number of registered 
employees 
Actual employees (%) Employees receiving  
social assistance (%) 
Employees not paid (%) 
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 
JSCs 4,902 4,846 4,757 45.9 45.3 46.5 5.4 4.9 2.1 48.7 49.8 51.4 
A 3,592 3,544 3,433 50.3 49.1 50.4 4.4 0.5 0.9 45.5 50.5 48.7 
B 680 643 690 35.3 34.7 38.0 15.9 34.4 9.7 48.8 30.9 52.3 
C 630 659 634 32.4 35.5 34.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.7 64.5 65.5 
D (SOEs) 28,185 38,671 37,380 54.4 55.8 54.7 8.2 8.1 7.3 37.4 36.1 38.0 
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conditions. The tendency towards faster job cuts in 2001 observed among SOEs was that, 
although decision-makers, employees were not private owners with defined stakes, thus 
they could search for other possibilities outside the company easier than their counterpart 
in Group A. However, this was not the case for Group B which is similar to SOEs. There 
is no clear-cut interpretation except the psychological feelings of employees in Group B 
who believe to be different from SOEs or effective owners.  
A growing concern is that almost all actual employees are the former employees 
whose average age was over 40, and it is to believe that they will stay with the company 
for a longer time, as the theory of EOFs has established. Moreover, if it comes to any 
possible recruitment, the primary candidates are those on the waiting list who are also 
old. Their level of skills has not changed much since the early 1990s or before. Only 
privatisation which may be applied to SOEs and Group C, can stop the further aging of 
employment structure. For the two other groups the hope of bringing about any change in 
this respect, lies in secondary privatisation. 
 
3.4 Financial Performance17 
 
 All Gjakovar SOEs covered by the survey were performing profitably before 
embarking on privatisation, i.e. before 1990 or 1989. Financial results went through a 
drastic decline throughout the 1990s reaching their lowest level during the war. By 1998 
half of them were loss-makers. In spite of a mild recovery in the post-war period, they are 
still far from their pre-1990 level. The results are presented in Table 3, consisting of a 
number of performance indicators for all groups, including few indicators of Group E or 
private SMEs with which we can compare JSCs.    
                                                 
17
 The figures in this section appear in Deutschemarks (DM) and in Appendix to this paper in Euro (€).  
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Table 3: Financial performance of JSCs, SOEs, and private SMEs (in DM) 
 Financial results per company Financial results per active worker Proportion of total financial indicators 
Groups*  
by years 
Revenues Costsa) Salaries  Profit/Loss b) Revenues Costs Salaries Profit/Loss Salaries as % 
of revenues 
Costs as % 
of revenues 
Profit as % 
of revenues 
1999 c)            
JSCs 434,439 357,527 118,301 -41,389d) 3,477 2,861 947 -331d) 27.2 82.3 -9.5 
A 647,498 604,550 184,845 -141,897e) 2,870 2,679 819 -629e) 28.5 93.4 -21.9 
B 151,205 42,231 47,278 61,696 4,410 1,232 1,379 1,799f) 31.3 27.9 40.8 
C 291,555 178,777 56,238 56,540 4,288 2,629 827 831 19.3 61.3 19.4 
D (SOEs) 1,053,885 741,996 234,825 77,064g) 6,601 4,647 1,471 483 22.3 70.4 7.3 
E (SMEs) 109,153 n/a 39,948 n/a 8,707 n/a 3,187 n/a 36.6 n/a n/a 
2000            
JSCs 1,257,390 780,010 345,512 131,868 10,306 6,394 2,832 1,081 27.5 62.0 10.5 
A 2,000,990 1,523,903 516,072 -38,985 9,205 7,010 2,374 -179 25.8 76.2 -1.9 
B 344,216 47,311 112,258 184,647 10,805 1,485 3,524 5,796 32.6 13.7 53.6 
C 1,055,163 269,159 237,647 548,357h) 13,528 3,451 3,047 7,030h) 22.5 25.5 52.0 
D (SOEs) 2,374,746 1,067,555 459,608 847,583i) 12,876 5,788 2,492 4,596 19.4 45.0 35.7 
E (SMEs) 99,115 n/a 38,032 n/a 7,116 n/a 2,731 n/a 38.4 n/a n/a 
2001c)            
JSCs 780,249 449,532 211,305 119,412 6,352 3,660 1,720 972 27.1 57.6 15.3 
A 1,461,780 819,033 322,099 320,648 6,760 3,787 1,489 1,483 22.0 56.0 21.9 
B 181,134 25,507 45,217 110,410 4,839 681 1,208 2,950 25.0 14.1 61.0 
C 216,009 134,555 155,803 -74,349 2,959 1,843 2,134 -1,018 72.1 62.3 -34.4 
D (SOEs) 1,583,460 1,235,839 483,603 -135,982j) 10,143 7,916 3,098 -871 30.5 78.0 -8.6 
E (SMEs) 91,628 n/a 28,853 n/a 6,854 n/a 2,682 n/a 39.1 n/a n/a 
* Number of observations: 18 for JSCs (8 for Group A, 7 for Group B, 3 for Group C), SOEs (96 for 1999, 117 for 2000, and 131 for 2001), SMEs (280 for 1999 and 2000, and 
570 for 2001).  
a)
 In the Yugoslav accounting standards costs exclude labour costs. Many companies still retain this convention; 
b) Profit before taxes. There was no such a tax at that time;     c)  Explanation for the year 1999 and 2001 as in previous table; 
d)
 8 companies loss-makers;          e) 3 out of 8 companies profitable; 
f)  2 out of 7 companies loss-makers;         g) 11 out of 96 SOEs loss-makers; 
h)
 1 out of 3 companies was a loss-maker;        i)  10 out of 117 SOEs loss-makers;  
j)
 46 out of 131 SOEs loss-makers.              
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Revenue per company has constantly increased over years in all groups with the 
exception of Group E. The decline in this group is caused by new entries of small enterprises, 
thus making revenues per company on average fall. The largest revenue per company for the 
first two years was reported among SOEs resulting from higher level of capacity utilisation. 
In 2001, revenue per SOE seem to have been far smaller than in Group A companies  which 
are reported for the first half of 2001. The same can be said for revenue per active worker 
(except in 1999 where they were highest in Group E). In any case, revenues alone do not 
indicate which group is more efficient. The groups, in particular SOEs also had high costs, 
both per company and per active worker. The most cost-efficient Group per active worker in 
2001 was B, probably because of smaller volume of activity. However, this group is also 
distinguished for the whole period under consideration in having the lowest costs as a 
proportion of revenues.  
A more important indicator in terms of financial performance is the average salary 
per active worker. In theory, Group E was not expected to pay its workers higher salaries on 
average in 1999 and 2001. Further mixed evidence was found between SOEs and groups of 
JSCs. Being more profitable, SOEs distributed higher level of salaries per active worker in 
1999, lower than Groups B and C in 2000, and again higher in 2001. The reason why SOEs 
were doing so was that in initial phase the workers needed to make themselves better off 
immediately without thinking much in longer run. JSCs were not only paying lower salaries 
to active workers, but even that lower level paid represented higher proportion of revenues 
(especially in Groups A and B) than in SOEs.  
In 2000, Group A in general was still unprofitable, but it made some improvements. 
Salaries and costs as a proportion of revenues declined from the previous year. A further 
decline in 2001 turned the group to profitability with a profit amounting to around 20% of 
revenues. Just the opposite has happened with the behaviour of SOEs and Group C which 
turned from profitability in the first two years to loss-makers in 2001. The causes of this 
behaviour should be traced in undefined property rights and unresolved ownership issues, 
which made workers more willing to distribute the firms’ revenues as labour incomes or 
salaries. Both these groups, especially SOEs, were also not careful against the rise in costs as 
a proportion of revenues.    
The figures on financial performance lead to the following conclusions. That Group 
A distributed the highest proportion of profit as salaries only in 1999, confirms the theory of 
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LMFs and EOFs on profit allocation in the short-run. However, in the following two years 
the group gradually adjusted its performance through reducing the costs and began 
accumulating some profit for longer term objectives. On the other hand, although SOEs were 
in a better position at the beginning, it was expected they allocate more and more revenues as 
labour incomes. Such an incentive was influenced by their undefined ownership and 
uncertainty about method of privatisation in the future which may not make them the owners 
of the companies they were working for. Under this uncertainty, the workers in SOEs were 
expected to take advantage and make themselves individually better off in the short-run than 
those in Group A where ownership is defined. It follows the conclusion that ownership does 
matter in different objectives, i.e. the owners of the companies look after their longer interest 
more than non-defined owners. 
The results were mixed and can be divided into two groups. The first group refers to 
expected findings, some of which included:  i)  in companies with well-defined ownership 
rights (Group A) less job cuts were made in response of gradual performance improvement; 
ii) the behaviour of SOEs and all groups of JSCs with respect to objective function was found 
to correspond with the theoretical expectations, i.e. they maximise personal incomes. This 
incentive was stronger in other groups, in particular among SOEs, and weaker in Group A. It 
was not a surprise why SOEs on average became loss-makers after their behaviour towards 
the salaries. The second group of results among others refers to an unexpected finding and 
not in line with the theory, i.e. the highest level of salaries per worker in private SMEs. 
Furthermore, the level of salaries as a proportion of revenues was the highest in this group in 
1999 and 2000. Lack of available data on costs which the theory suggests strong incentives to 
have them lower than in any other non-private ownership in order to maximise the profit (for 
which the data were also not available), did not enable drawing of a conclusion about 
efficiency of this group firms. 
To conclude this section, privatisation in Gjakova had positive effects from legal 
point of view as it prevented full impact of emergency measures. This effect was not 
sufficient to guarantee a better economic performance. Of course, the circumstances before 
as well as after the war were such that did not made possible that. In a more stable 
environment the effects of this partial transformation probably would have been clearer and 
easier to assess. Anyway, leaving aside the circumstances, privatisation in Gjakova has had 
very small or no effects due to poor management which has not changed. The main lesson for 
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SOEs to be learned from the experience of Gjakova companies is that internal privatisation 
cannot be preferred for two main reasons. First, employees in SOEs were not at work for 
nearly a decade and significantly lagged behind in skills, and second, they do not have 
resources to restructure enterprises in bad shape.    
 
4.   Approaches to Privatisation and the Critical Assessment of the Privatisation 
Proposals 
 
After the end of the Serbian rule, UNMIK took charge of Kosovo’s economic 
development. According to Article 17 of the UN Security Council  Resolution 1244, UNMIK 
was to develop a comprehensive approach to the development of a democratic market 
economy. This formulation was too general and did not specifically refer to privatisation. 
There were some discussions on whether UNMIK had the mandate and authority to privatise 
SOEs. It may be argued that UNMIK had this authority from the very early days of its 
establishment by the essence of paragraph 103 of the Report of the UN Secretary General on 
UNMIK of 12 July 1999 which stated: the Special Representative will seek to create a viable, 
market-based economy and to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic and social 
development of Kosovo. Paragraph 105 also restated the creation of a viable market economy. 
Being a trustee of social ownership and having to create a viable market economy, implied 
that UNMIK should have considered the privatisation of SOEs as one of its major task. 
UNMIK was of course aware about this interpretation but did not know what to do with 
transformations that had been forcefully undertaken under Serbian rule in the 1990s. The 
answer to this problem could have been provided by the notion of Applicable Law. Initially 
UNMIK through the Regulation 1999/1 (on the Authority of the Interim Administration in 
Kosovo) decided that the law applicable in Kosovo should be Regulations promulgated by 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and the laws in force in Kosovo 
before 22 March 1989. A separate Regulation on the Law Applicable (Regulation 1999/24) 
and amendments that followed in Regulation 2000/59 made the meaning of Applicable Law 
ambiguous, by allowing some of the laws passed after 22 March 1989 which were not 
discriminatory, and did not violate the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948. In 
the absence of clear references to particular Serbian laws of the 1990s (for example those 
authorising ownership transactions), the ambiguity about which of these laws are or are not 
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applicable has continued to the present time. This deficiency in definition explains some of 
UNMIK’s problems in approaching the privatisation.     
Under growing pressure from various local institutions, including SOEs themselves,18 
UNMIK began to deal with the question of their ownership. While discussions about 
privatisation continued, UNMIK embarked on a policy of ‘commercialisation’ (leasing or 
managements contracts) as an interim measure and a preparatory phase towards later 
privatisation.  At the same time, the DTI began addressing proposals for privatisation to 
UNMIK. 
 
4.1. The Critical Assessment of the Privatisation Proposals 
 
Since the problem of privatisation was addressed and UNMIK decided to deal with it, 
the problem itself became how to find a formula, or how to privatise. After nearly a year of 
discussions and analysis, Pillar IV19 of UNMIK published a proposal known as the White 
Paper. UNMIK and DTI claimed that the Office of Legal Affairs at the UN did not support 
its implementation. Another gateway to privatisation was by the DTI’s proposal to transform 
SOEs into JSCs (in the spirit of the Marković Law) with the majority of shares distributed to 
employees. It is not known why this proposal was not approved, but the suspicions remained 
that it had met the same fate as the White Paper and been opposed by the UN Legal Office, 
though there is no evidence of either refusal or rejection. Another draft proposal prepared by 
DTI containing three approaches to privatisation, served as a basis for preparing the 
Regulation on Kosovo Trsut Agency (KTA) which made privatisation a reality. Before 
discussing this Regulation, it is important to look at earlier proposals in more details and 
critically assess their advantages and shortcomings. 
  
                                                 
18
 The Riinvest (2001) survey of SOEs revealed that about 80% of their managers supported privatisation and 
thought that this process is necessary and urgent. The survey does not provide any explanation to crucial 
questions as to what do they expect from privatisation, which methods they would prefer, or whether they 
understood what privatisation was? Some answers to these questions can be extracted from the survey of private 
SMEs by Riinvest (2002b) where privatisation is also strongly supported (78% of the respondents). Some 65% 
of the surveyed private businesses emphasised their readiness to be included in privatisation: 35% of them 
would be ready to buy a proportion of shares in SOEs, 19% were interested in leasing, and 14% would be ready 
to buy an entire SOE.        
19
 UNMIK exercises its administration through 4 Pillars in the following areas: Pillar I – police and justice (led 
by the UN); Pillar II – civil administration (also led by the UN); Pillar III – democratisation and institution 
building (under the direct of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE); and Pillar IV – 
in charge of reconstruction and economic development (directed by the European Union).  
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4.2. The First Proposal: The White Paper or Enterprise Development Strategy 
 
The Paper wanted to make clear that, if UNMIK’s responsibility as defined in section 6 
of the Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo was 
to administer the state property, then administration meant a more efficient use of that 
property. Efficiency could not be ensured if the property was not transferred to private hands. 
To establish that UNMIK was able to engage in privatisation, the Paper referred to paragraph 
11g of the Resolution 1244, i.e. the UNMIK’s mandate to support the reconstruction of key 
infrastructure and other economic reconstruction, was interpreted as it included the 
responsibility to transform SOEs. This interpretation then was related to the Report of the 
Secretary General when he had mentioned the establishment of a market-based economy. 
Obviously, that type of economy could not be worked up with a bulk of the assets in social 
ownership.  
Among initial measures for SOEs, it was proposed a strategy to deal with large 
enterprises at first. The strategy was especially concerned with those SOEs that were 
inoperative, because of the fear that the longer their inactivity continues, the more they will 
decapitalise. Having in mind that their ownership could not be resolved overnight, the 
programme proposed initial measures including leasing or management contracts in order to 
preserve the value of assets and encourage economic activity. The proposal recognised that 
these measures (leasing, management contracts) were second best options in comparison with 
privatisation and suggested that they should be limited to a certain number of large SOEs. 
The implementation of this programme would have been preceded by an Ownership 
Adjudication Commission that had to be established as an independent judicial body to 
resolve ownership claims. This body would also decide if the laws in force between 1989 and 
1999 were discriminatory or implemented in a discriminatory manner. The Commission 
would take into consideration claims against SOEs, especially the claims of enterprises or 
other entities from Serbia. This idea of the proposal was strongly criticised and opposed by 
the Kosovo people and institutions, with the strongest opposition coming from SOEs.20 The 
proposal was clearly not aware of the difficulties of resolving the issue of claims which it 
considered as a gateway to enterprise privatisation (described in chapter 5 of the Paper). 
                                                 
20
 Similar remark has been addressed to the Paper when it mentioned the possibility of UNMIK applying the 
1997 Serbian Law on Ownership Transformation, as it considered the Marković Law as unsuitable and 
proposed that they could be complemented by new rules on private sector in Kosovo. 
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Pillar IV recommended to UNMIK that the White Paper should be implemented as 
soon as possible. UNMIK thought that they should seek permission from UN to embark on 
privatisation. Although no official statement about either the referral of the issue to, or its 
rejection by the UN Legal Office, UNMIK and DTI authorities maintained that the proposal 
had not received the necessary approval, because of the absence of the mandate for 
privatisation. The White Paper had tried to argue that the mandate was implicit in Resolution 
1244 but was clearly not able to convince the UN authorities. 
 
4.3. The Second Proposal: Transformation of SOEs into JSCs with Majority of Shares 
Distributed to Employees  
 
The proposal envisaged that SOEs should be transformed to JSCs with 60% of shares 
distributed to employees and the remaining 40% going to a Kosovo Development Fund who 
would try to find strategic buyers for these blocks of shares. The proposal (as pointed out 
earlier was prepared in the spirit of Marković Law) was publicised as being fair and 
acceptable to employees. The DTI thought that the current workers in SOEs are largely the 
same as before the introduction of emergency measures, that this method would limit the 
opportunity for political interference and would enjoy large support from SOEs themselves, 
thus enabling transformation to be completed more quickly.  
If applied, the transformation would have meant extending the process that had taken 
place in Gjakova in the early 1990s to other SOEs. A major potential problem here was the 
diffused ownership structure emerging from the proposed distribution of shares and, 
entrenched management. The importance of the proposal should be viewed from another 
perspective, i.e. the psychological on SOEs’ workers. Since the workers were to become the 
main beneficiaries by the proposed privatisation plan, they were expected to take care of the 
assets.  
There was public opposition to the second proposal with the main concern related to 
delaying the restructuring of SOEs (Riinvest, 2001a) and even though DTI tried to defend the 
proposals, it realised that the proposal was not a workable proposition as it would not lead to 
an improvement in efficiency or the regeneration of enterprises. The second proposal was 
removed from public discussion without any explanation.  
The DTI prepared yet another model to resolve the problem of SOEs. This 
determination ensured that the UNMIK’s mission cannot succeed in providing economic 
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growth without resolving the privatisation problem. A new document entitled Proposals for 
Privatisation of Socially-Owned Enterprises in Kosovo, with three ideas to promote 
ownership transformation and recommended that UNMIK adopt a policy for privatisation of 
SOEs through: i) transformation plan with 60% of shares going to employees and 40% to a 
Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA); ii) spin-off approach; and iii) reorganisation or liquidation 
through bankruptcy. In terms of contents, time and ideas, this document elaborated had an 
intermediate phase for two reasons: first, it did not give up but went on to recommend the 
second proposal for some firms (the transformation plan); and, second, it introduced two 
methods which later were elaborated and adopted in a new regulation that became the legal 
basis for privatisation in Kosovo (spin-off model). 
The intermediate proposal, however, had the same fate as the previous ones and did 
not get very far. The difficulties of finding an appropriate privatisation model acceptable to 
the majority of stakeholders and obtaining the approval of the UN (if it was to require such 
approval), resulted in further delay in the process. The delay was a real concern for all, 
because of the fear that it would lead to further decapitalisation of SOEs. 
 
4.4. The Third (Approved) Proposal: Regulation on Kosovo Trust Agency 
 
The problem of privatisation in Kosovo seems to have eventually found a solution. 
The approval and signing of the UNMIK Regulation 2002/2 on the establishment of KTA 
(which is analogous to the agency for privatisation in other countries) on 13 June 2002 by the 
SRSG (Michael Steiner) was the first serious step in this process. As such, KTA was 
established as an independent agency under the reserved power of the SRSG, i.e. UNMIK 
continues to retain the right to administer SOEs and Publicly-owned Enterprises (POEs).21 
KTA became responsible for the privatisation of SOEs and the reform of POEs during its 
mandate which expires on 13 June 2005. POEs were excluded from privatisation at this 
stage, a process which has also happened in other countries in their early transition. 
                                                 
21
 The approval of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo marked the 
beginning of gradual transfer of competencies from the international community to Kosovo’s newly created 
government. The transfer of power is not full and a number of key decision-making areas are earmarked as the 
‘reserved power’ for SRSG, whose power is derived from the Resolution 1244. A long list of competencies 
falling in the reserved power for SRSG as laid down in section 8 of the Framework includes the following 
economic areas: approval of the Kosovo Budget; monetary policy; controlling the UNMIK’s customs service; 
administration of social, state, and public property; appointing of members in economic and fiscal council; 
appointing of tax inspectors, etc.   
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The Agency took full control of SOEs, including appointing and replacing directors 
and workers’ councils, monitoring enterprise operation, administering their accounts and 
assets, restructuring, transforming, initiating bankruptcy proceedings, etc. This makes 
privatisation highly centralised and, in theory, creates the conditions for the resolution of 
problems in managing social property after the war (by putting such property under state 
control).22 
 The Agency exercises its power through a Board of Directors consisting of 8 
members (4 internationals and 4 Kosovars). The Chairman of the Board is ex officio the head 
of EU Pillar IV and one of the 4 Kosovar directors is appointed as Vice Chairman. The three 
other Kosovar Directors are also appointed by the SRSG from the ministries of Provisional 
Institutions of Self-government (the Minister of Trade and Industry, and the Minister of 
Economy and Finance), the Chairman of BSPK, and a minister from the Serb community 
(Article 12). The composition of the Board seems to have equally distributed the power 
between Kosovars and internationals in number, though the main power still remains with the 
SRSG.   
The methods of privatisation as determined in Articles 8 and 9 of the KTA Regulation 
included: the establishment of subsidiary companies of SOEs (spin-offs) and, voluntary 
liquidation.23 The implementation of these methods is outlined in Article 10 and elaborated in 
more details in Operational Policies of  KTA (to be discussed in the next section). Despite 
the fact that the results of commercialisation were below expectations,24 the process 
remained as an option in operational polices as spin-off and liquidation, and its opportunity 
of implementation is envisaged in certain or limited SOEs (Article 5.1.3). 
                                                 
22
 Under institutional and legal vacuum managing of many SOEs became a problem between various groups 
who seized control over them. There were two main political groups behind this control that generated disputes: 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The two sides of the 
dispute were related to the appointment of management, in particular the directors. The management of SOEs in 
many cases turned controversial for the workers after the appointments of the directors by the provisional 
government of Kosovo of PDK. The workers did not agree and often rebelled against the director whether 
because he was not running SOEs on their behalf or failed to pay their salaries regularly. After LDK won 
elections at the local level in December 2000, the municipal management demanded to change the management 
appointed by PDK (ESI, 2002). 
23
 Although liquidation is not often used as a standard method of privatisation, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 
(1996) regard it as a very transparent method with least chance of incorporating corruption. They support this 
view by emphasising that liquidation procedures are quick, that the new owners usually are without historical 
corruption background or linked to the previous control rights that may delay privatisation. Nevertheless, they 
do not reject the possibility that even this method can face delays in implementation by bureaucratic procedures.  
24
 Out of 65 tenders announced, the DTI was able to sign the contracts for commercialisation of 11 SOEs. The 
preliminary outcome of this process was 5 complete failures and 2 cases associated with problems. Only in 4 
SOEs commercialisation seemed to have produced moderate results (ESI, 2002).  
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For disputes arising from privatisation and the manners of resolving them, the 
Regulation envisages the establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Kosovo (Article 18.4). The proceeds generated from the sale of SOEs will go to KTA’s 
account (Article 8.6) and will remain frozen in closed accounts. The Regulation is silent 
about their eventual use, but they are expected to meet the ownership and creditors’ claims 
after privatisation. No exclusion has been made on the type of creditors’ claims to be 
submitted against SOEs. Article 5.3. determines how KTA will treat the transformation of 
SOEs taken place during emergency measures. It states that the transformation of an SOE 
affects its status only if it ‘occurred before 22 March 1989’ or was ‘based on Applicable Law 
and implemented in a non-discriminatory manner’ if it occurred thereafter. The re-
registration or merger of SOEs and POEs has been addressed with the same definition in 
Article 5.4. While it is clear this formulation is addressed to transformation of Gjakova 
enterprises, the re-registration, mergers, and transformation of the rest of SOEs during 
emergency measures remains ambiguous, as the formulation of ‘non-discriminatory manner’ 
itself is not clearly defined. The fact is that UNMIK may or may not interpret some of the 
Serbian Laws in the early 1990s as either discriminatory or implemented in a discriminatory 
manner. The KTA Regulation is also silent about the huge damages inflicted by Serbia 
against SOEs in Kosovo and, instead of addressing these claims against Serbia, as a trustee of 
social ownership in Kosovo, it is offering the opportunity to Serbian enterprises to make 
claims against those that they forcefully and illegally integrated in their enterprises.  
 
4.3.1. Operational Policies of the KTA 
 
Although the Regulation on KTA was approved in June 2002, it was necessary to 
undertake two additional steps to make privatisation a reality: i) the preparation and approval 
of the Operational Polices; and ii) the establishment of the Special Chamber of the Supreme 
Court, which was approved as a separate Regulation. The operational policies are not a 
separate regulation but the part of the KTA Regulation, or the elaboration of its Article 10 in 
greater details and approved separately. The fact that they were approved with a considerable 
delay (on 25 February 2003) led to a further postponement of the implementation of 
privatisation.  
 On the issue of ownership transformation during emergency measures, Operational 
Policies continue to apply the same definition as Article 2.2.2 of the KTA Regulation. In 
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further explanation it is noted that the Agency should confirm the evidence for any 
transformation of an SOE. As the Regulations leave room for ‘whatever evidence’ to be 
considered, and given the ambiguous definition of the Applicable Law, the possibility exists 
that many SOEs may be found to have been transformed. 
 The essence of the ‘spin-off’ is that the assets of SOEs in better condition are 
transferred partially or fully to newly established companies. Liabilities or debts will not be 
transferred and will remain with the old company. They will be resolved after privatisation 
by the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court which will consider the ownership and 
creditor claims lodged against enterprises. The advantage of this model is that it separates the 
privatisation process from the ownership issues and thus facilitates faster privatisation.  It is 
attractive to investors, who do not need to worry about the debts or ownership disputes that a 
company may be subject to. The KTA will tender25 new companies for sale to investors. For 
small and medium SOEs privatisation is by auctions, and for large SOEs by special spin-off. 
Bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation would apply to SOEs that have no prospects of survival. 
The employees are entitled to 20% of the proceeds according to their number of years of 
employment (Article 7.14.2) which the regulation has not clarified which years will be taken 
into consideration.      
   
4.3.2. The establishment of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo 
 
The establishment of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court was authorised by 
the UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/13, on the same date as the KTA. The Chamber has full 
jurisdiction over the KTA (Article 30.1) and falls under the authority of the SRSG in terms of 
his ‘reserved power’. Given that the Regulation does not exclude any claimant from filing a 
claim and that claimants have enough time (up to 9 months) to submit claims challenging the 
decision of the KTA (Article 6.1), may result in increasing the volume of work of the 
Chamber and delaying solutions to the claims.  
Claims addressed to the Chamber may also face counterclaims (Article 6.3). The 
Chamber may order any person in Kosovo to provide necessary information to prove the 
validity of the claims. A major problem is that SOEs in Kosovo are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to the settling of claims. The Chamber deals only with the claims related to the 
                                                 
25
 The rules for tender prohibit from bidding individuals who have been found guilty of a crime after June 1999, 
but fail to say anything for similar cases before that period.  
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property in Kosovo and not outside. The right to compensation (which is meant to respond to 
counterclaims, but not restitution) is also restricted with the property in the territory of 
Kosovo. As it was shown earlier, much of the assets of SOEs in Kosovo have been 
transferred or taken away to Serbia. SOEs in Kosovo do not have a chance to trace their 
claims in enterprises or individuals in Serbia, while Serbian institutions and individuals are 
able to use the Chamber to pursue claims in Kosovo. If the Serbian claims during the 1990s 
are not rejected, there is a probability that ownership claims will be so huge that total 
proceeds from the sale of SOEs in Kosovo will not be sufficient to cover them. 
The last step in completing the necessary legal framework for privatisation was the 
approval of the Regulation 2003/13 on Land Use on 13 May 2003, almost one year after the 
Regulation on KTA was approved, thus contributing to further delay in privatisation. This 
delay occurred in the UN Legal Office in New York where the Regulation was reviewed 
before its signing by SRSG in Kosovo. It is intersting to note that all proposals and the 
regulations regarding privatisation in Kosovo are prepared by international experts. Local 
stakeholders involved in KTA seem not be interested more in anything else than their salaries 
as employees. And here we come again to the objective function in the short run, maybe 
much shorter than in the theory of LMF and OEF. These stakeholders are comfortable in 
pursuing this objective as long as they are ignorant and do not care as they should do for 
privatisation of the property of society in which they are part of.   
 
5. Progress and Retreat in Privatisation: A Preliminary Assessment 
 
After the necessary legal framework seemed to have been completed, the mission of 
the KTA was to privatise SOEs quickly. This section assesses the progress of privatisation, 
limited to two rounds so far, by considering the main features of the privatised SOEs. Since 
the formal sale of SOEs alone does not imply complete deal of privatisation, the assessment 
will emphasise the difficulties, delays and associated problems in implementation.  
The first bids for privatisation of 6 SOEs were opened on 14 July, the date which 
marks the beginning of privatisation after the war. A total of 18 SOEs, transformed into 21 
newly established companies (NewCos), were announced for privatisation in the second 
round. A comparison of the two rounds shows that KTA provided more information in the 
Internet to interested buyers on company profile for SOEs of the first round than for the 
second round. In spite of providing less information, buyers expressed more interest in the 
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second round, both in terms of the number of bids received and the price that SOEs were sold 
at. For example, the average price of companies sold also increased from less than half a 
million to over €1.37 million (see Appendix). Lower prices in the first round which prevailed 
despite the fact that companies of this round were in a better position in terms of turnover, 
employment, and profit, acted as a signal to encourage more buyers to enter the process in 
the second round By all means, prices that the companies were sold at should be considered 
as extremely low, even though SOEs were seriously decapitalised. 
Both rounds have generally attracted domestic buyers, mostly private businesses. This 
may correspond to the point made earlier about the readiness of private businesses to 
participate in privatisation or buy an entire SOE. Foreign buyers were not present as it was 
expected. Some foreign participation showed in Appendix belongs to Albanians living 
abroad who wanted to return or invest in their country (mostly Kosovar Albanians). Foreign 
(real) investors should not have been expected because of political uncertainty.    
The privatisation of SOEs in both rounds was expected to bring a total of €29,335,570 
into the KTA’s account. That did not happen as some winners did not paid the amount they 
had offered in time. Moreover, court order stopped the ownership transformation in another 
first round companies (Montazhi).26 Six winning bids of the second round were cancelled. 
They remain to be re-entered in future rounds together with two others from the first round 
(companies in shadowed rows in Appendix).  
Specific tender cancellations highlight the shortcomings that the rules of tender 
contain. The Board of KTA abandoned the winning bid of tobacco plant IDGJ because it 
estimated that the price of €581,000 does not reflect the real value of IDGJ (Koha Ditore, 
06.09.2003). Has the Board estimated or considered that the price of other companies sold 
out corresponded to their real value? One winning bid in the second round was cancelled 
(Mladost/Agrokultura) when the local Serbs on site had gathered not to allow the company 
fall in the hands of an Albanian buyer (Koha Ditore 09.09.2003). The situation was not better 
with the approved bids either. Even though the buyers paid the bid price for the companies in 
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 In October the media reported that the workers of Montazhi were refusing to hand over the company, or 
allowing the buyer to enter the company. The workers insisted that their bid to buy the company was only by 
€2,000 smaller than the winning bid (€208,000 vs. €210,000). The rules of tender did not specify if the 20% of 
proceeds to be allocated to the workers could be incorporated in the bid price when the workers bid for the 
company in which they work. Thus if the 20% of the proceeds are treated as a discount to the workers, their bid 
would have been the highest price. The case remains to be resolved by the Special Chamber when the workers 
have accused the KTA.    
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time, the KTA did not sign the sale agreement with them within the 30 days as required by 
the rules of tender (the first sale agreement between the KTA and the new owner was signed 
on 19.12.2003 and even this agreement was not ratified by the KTA Board until 9 March 
2004). Consequently, the new owners did not have access to their enterprises and did not 
know what was going on there.27 By implication, employees had not received their 20% 
either, which has been stopped over the issue who are the eligible employees. 
Serbia was not silent and began to pay attention about privatisation in Kosovo.  The 
Serbian minister for economy and privatisation, Aleksandar Vlahović, announced that the 
register of Serbia’s ownership claims in Kosovo would be opened in Belgrade, and this 
attitude was supported by the World Bank (Glas Javnosti, 20.09.2002). Suddenly on 7 
October, the Pillar IV through a press release announced that the third round of privatisation 
has been cancelled due to some necessary explanations from the UN Office of Legal Affairs 
in New York (Kosova Sot, 08.10.2003). Suspension occurred after the change in the KTA’s 
management who began to introduce changes in operational policies. Privatisation resumed 
with the third round after a year (in October 2004) associated with similar problems from the 
previous rounds. In less than two months (in December) the KTA again proposed changes in 
the operational policies. Certainly these will not be the last changes and it remains unclear 
how the process will proceed under frequent reshuffling the cards and when it will be 
completed.  
 
6. Conclusions and remarks 
 
The whole of point of this paper was to show how unique and controversial 
privatisation in Kosovo is. It was impossible to prove that without looking back at many hang 
ups from the past and current different institutional settings that made it so. Such a 
phenomenon has come as a result of many factors, which made privatisation delay 
significantly and begin at the time when this process in most transition countries has been 
completed. The first delay and with greatest consequences was caused by the imposition of 
emergency measures. By those illegal measures Serbia dismissed in wholesale the Albanian 
                                                 
27
 In this vacuum, decapitalisation of the companies sold grew either by non-operation or the current 
management taking advantage and clearing out the cash before the new owners moved in. The new owners 
threatened to sue the KTA (Bota Sot, 29.11.2003). Unemployment in these companies also was rising and the 
workers were demanding their salaries from KTA (Koha Ditore, 25.08.2003).  
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employees and carried out various experiments with social and public ownership of Kosovo. 
After all, the experiments resulted in violence and ethnic conflict which brought 
condemnation by the international community. This of course seemed to have brought at an 
end the experiments with social ownership that emergency management was carrying out, 
but unfortunately was not the end of Serbia’s claims based on those experiments. Serbia’s 
ownership claims and demands to review the status of SOEs for alleged transformation 
during emergency measures, are illegal. Kosovo had the same authorisations to manage her 
social ownership like every other federal unit of former Yugoslavia. Therefore, Serbia is 
responsible for all the consequences and huge damages inflicted against SOEs and POEs in 
Kosovo during the 1990s.  
Under the Marković Law it was possible to implement privatisation in Gjakova, the 
process which has not been completed, again because of Serbia’s impediments. The 
experience of privatised enterprises in Gjakova is mixed as it both confirmed and 
unconfirmed the theories of EOFs’ behaviour. The results would have been more conclusive 
if all enterprises were fully privatised and operating in a more stable environment. In any 
case, the process in mid-way must be completed through a new regulation for Group A 
companies, while reprivatisation of companies in Group B and C should be considered.  
Ambiguities concerning UNMIK’s mandate to privatise SOEs were nothing else just 
(miss)interpretation of the Resolution 1244 in various ways, or attempting to undermine the 
mission of UNMIK that was clearly defined but in a broader sense. Difficulties to find an 
appropriate model of privatisation and misunderstanding the nature of social ownership 
represent the second delay of privatisation in Kosovo. The decision of UNMIK, KTA 
respectively, to take full control over SOEs and make them like KTA-owned enterprises, was 
a step back compared to self-management. UNMIK made mistake by identifying or mixing 
social property with state property. The latter was not recognised in the self-management 
system. State property is something illegally created by Serbia.  
Proposals for privatisation generated the ideas that were more the outcome of 
observed circumstances. For example, the White Paper elaborated the problem in a broader 
view. It proposed restructuring and many other issues to be resolved before privatisation. The 
DTI made the second proposal after it had started to be familiar with the characteristics of 
social ownership and the previous system. The issue of economic efficiency could be 
resolved later through secondary privatisation if primary privatisation was to completed 
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quickly. Spin-off is an appropriate model that provides opportunity for fresh capital and 
investment, badly needed by SOEs.  
Problems in implementation and interim suspension of privatisation should be listed 
as the third delay, the delay which continues. The consequences of this delay are apparent 
making the declared mission of the KTA to privatise all SOEs by mid 2005 an unattainable 
illusion. Until then, the KTA will be still dealing with problems in implementation of the 
process. While UNMIK on the one hand continues to keep privatisation as a reserved power, 
continuation of the process cannot be a hostage of the Serbian laws, and UNMIK is 
responsible for that. The biggest failure of UNMIK is that it continues to be silent about 
those laws that generated so many problems. Since UNMIK is not abrogating them, then that 
means legalising emergency measures and further complications, not limited to privatisation 
alone but also to other processes of transition in Kosovo. Coming back to local Kosovo 
stakeholders, with limited competencies they have, still have done very little for privatisation 
or below expectations. It should be accepted that UNMIK has the merits vis-à-vis domestic 
institutions and ‘experts’ (?) in launching the process. Local players should struggle to take 
the governance of every segment that they believe can handle. A more professional 
commitment to this very important economic process should be considered for a longer time. 
At any time the Government of Kosovo feels that it has sufficient expertise and is capable of 
carrying out privatisation, there is no reason why not taking tough line against the ‘reserved 
power’. However, based on the experience so far, one may very easy and rightly guess that 
locals may make the fragile process much worse.    
As what impact spin-off privatisation will bring, that is something that remains to be 
seen later. The biggest problem now is how to come to the ending point when all SOEs fall in 
private hands without further delay. Regardless how the process will evolve in the future and 
who the buyers will be, one thing is certain: that the impact of privatisation in overall 
economic activity will be far smaller than it was in any other transition country.  And finally, 
the process will be unique by unresolved problems from the past halting current process and 
undermining its prospects for the future, and maybe will leave implications even after its 
completion.  
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Appendix: Fact sheet of the privatised SOEs in the first and second round  
First round: tender announcement on 15 May, bid day on 14 July, 2003. 
 
Name of company 
 
Sector of activity 
Price of 
sale in € 
Number of actual 
workers in 2002a)  
Proceeds in € per 
worker (20%)b) 
Capacity utilisation Turnover (in €) Profit/Loss 
2001c)  2002 d)  2001c)   2002 d)  2001c) 
1. Energoinvest assembly unit Electric pylons and high voltage carriers  750,000  
187  (200) 
 
1,565 





-10,204 1a. Energoinvest NewCo Electric fuses 525,125 n/a 10% 
2. Montazhi Engineering/General Contracting 210,750 163  (179) 259 100% 40% 2,140,807 1,667,075  63,522 
3. Lepencif)   Stonecutter 650,000 229  (266) 798 50% 25% 1,612,873 1,400,000e) 1,510,731 
4. Termosistemi Commercial refrigerators unit  200,000 55  (64) 245 25% n/a 806,338 n/a 6,561 
5. Përparimi f) g)   Factory of perforated bricks 2,298,749 103  (400) 2,821 n/a 50% n/a 800,000  n/a 
6. Ringovi g) Brick factory - 84  (100) - 70% n/a 614,670 n/a 34,121 
Average - 467,175 159 (177)  717 58% 24% 1,143,101 1,144,447 392,653 
Second round: tender announcement on 2 July, bid day on 3 September, 2003. 
7. IMN 19 Qershori Construction materials 805,500 112 1,438 n/a n/a n/a 602,548 n/a 
8. Plastika  Industrial plastic products 2,875,000 28 20,536 n/a n/a n/a 289,645 n/a 
9. ENG Beton Gravel and concrete  425,235 110  (162) 773 50% n/a 29,592 339,559 -77,551 
10. Kosovoplast  Building and insulation material  1,555,555 98 3,175 n/a n/a n/a 3,193,368 n/a 
11. Silcapor  Concrete blocks producer 2,824,153 343  (338) 1,647 47% n/a 2,408,488 1,792,910 -106,818 
12. Mladost/Agrokultura g)  Refrigeration plant 733,750 42  (250) 3,494 65% n/a 205,731 n/a 2,853 
13. Kosovo Construction Construction concrete plant  332,335 n/a (235) n/a n/a 20% 545,570 400,000 -37,208 
14. Kombinati i Drurit Wood processing 2,555,000 105  (121) 4,867 n/a 25% 230,510 184,962 -58,776 
15. IDGJ g) Tobacco  581,000  236 (240)  492 n/a 60% 1,101,052 949,178 97,166 
16. LUX  Shopping mall 2,025,000 333  (350)h) 1,216 n/a 50% h) 58,626 h) 264,000 21,511h) 
17. Hotel Adriatik  Tourism and catering 464,800 60 (204) 1,549 n/a 30% 50,630 n/a 1,582 
18. Progresi g) Printing  215,199  42  (63) 1,025 n/a 30% 39,199 90,000  7,653 
19. IMB Bread Factory NewCog) Food 405,417 45  (140) 1,802 n/a 60% 281,133 n/a 28,571 
20. IMB Flour Mill NewCo Food 406,000 45 (49)h)  1,804 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
21. Trepça Confection Textile 355,000 26  (35) 2,731 n/a 20% 32,799 n/a n/a 
22. Framakos NewCo  Pharmaceuticals 2,310,000  













1,577 22a. Austrian House NewCo f) Period house and plant 310,000 
22b. Blue factory NewCog) Herbal remedies 1,300,000 
23. Trofta f) Fish farm and motel 2,012,002 58 (55) 6,938 58% 60% 396,688 n/a 32,157 
24. Hotel Metohija/Rugovag)  Hotel and restaurant 2,210,000 0 (85) (5,200) n/a n/a 49,513 n/a 969 
Average - 1,375,399 123  (171) 3,217 55% 38% 471,902 895,454 -25,574 
a)
 Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of workers in 2001;   
b) Calculation: the 20% of total proceeds is divided by the number of workers, e.g. € 210,750x20%= € 42,150/163= € 259 per worker; 
 c)
 Riinvest’s survey data. The data for turnover and profit/loss account were in DM values and they are converted in Euros according to the exchange rate:  DM 1 = € 0.51;  
d)
 KTA’a data;     e) Refers to 2001;   f) Foreign buyers;      
g) Tender and bid winner abandoned. Companies will be re-tendered in future rounds. Not included in calculations.   
h) Figures for 2000. 
Source: KTA fact sheets, 2003, available at www.kta-kosovo.org, Riinvest survey data 2000 and 2001, and author’s own calculation.
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